TBC CAPITAL

MACRO, COMMODITY & CURRENCY MARKETS UPDATE

MAY 2026

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

ECONOMIC FIGURES IN FOCUS

6% US Annual PPI Inflation in April

115K Nonfarm payrolls added in the United States in April

TBCC VIEWS ON COMMODITIES

ASSET	PRICE	CHANGE, M/M	TBCC VIEW
Brent Crude, $/BBL	$92	-14%	MILDLY BEARISH
European Gas, EUR/MWh	$46	3%	MILDLY BEARISH
Gold $/Oz	$4,446	-6%	MILDLY BULLISH
Copper $/MT	$13,609	3%	NEUTRAL
Aluminum $/MT	$3,625	1%	NEUTRAL

TBCC VIEWS ON CURRENCIES

ASSET	PRICE	CHANGE, M/M	TBCC VIEW
EUR/USD	1.17	-1.3%	MILDLY BEARISH
GBP/USD	1.34	-1.7%	MILDLY BEARISH
USD/JPY	159	1.9%	NEUTRAL
USD/CNY	6.78	-0.7%	MILDLY BEARISH

Monetary Policy Overview

GLOBAL MONETARY POLICY UPDATE

US FEDERAL RESERVE: The April meeting minutes strengthened the higher-for-longer policy message, showing that while the FOMC kept rates unchanged at 3.5–3.75%, officials have become more concerned that inflation may stay above target for longer than previously expected, especially as the Iran conflict risks keeping energy prices. A vast majority of participants saw higher risks to the inflation outlook, and a majority noted that further policy firming could become appropriate, while many would have preferred removing the statement's implicit easing bias altogether. At the same time, the FED is not ready to tighten yet, as most participants still viewed long-term inflation expectations as stable and saw labor market risks to the downside. Overall, rate cuts now are much less likely than before the war, but persistent inflation would keep the door open to renewed tightening, leaving the FED in a patient, cautious and more hawkish stance.

BANK OF ENGLAND: The Bank of England's latest meeting also points to a more cautious and hawkish policy outlook, even though the MPC voted 8–1 to keep Bank Rate unchanged at 3.75%. Governor Bailey stressed that this was an "active" decision rather than a wait-and-see hold, reflecting the wide range of possible outcomes created by the Iran conflict and its impact on energy prices. The Bank's updated projections showed several scenarios in which policy rates would need to rise from current levels. However, Bailey pushed back on this interpretation by arguing that in most scenarios the necessary policy response could be achieved by reversing previously priced rate cuts rather than raising rates further. We continue to expect the MPC to remain on hold this year given our strategists' forecast for declines in energy prices, the likelihood of further labour market weakening, and Bailey's interpretation of the policy simulations.

EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK: The ECB's April meeting marked a clear hawkish shift, even though the Governing Council unanimously kept the policy rate unchanged at 2%. The key signal was President Lagarde's admission that a rate hike had been seriously debated, reflecting the fact that the Iran conflict has intensified upside inflation risks while also weakening the growth outlook. The Council ultimately chose to hold because hard data were still broadly in line with the baseline ანდ policy was already considered well-positioned before the energy shock However, the tone was clearly less comfortable: short-term inflation expectations have risen. With the situation "moving away" from the baseline, the June 11 meeting becomes the key reassessment point, and the ECB now appears to be moving toward renewed tightening, with two 25bp hikes in June and September as the most likely path if the conflict gradually resolves.

BANK OF JAPAN: The Bank of Japan kept its policy rate unchanged at 0.75% at its April 27–28 meeting, but the decision carried a noticeably hawkish signal, as three of nine board members dissented in favor of raising rates to 1.0%. Governor Ueda framed the Middle East disruption and higher crude oil prices as a two-sided shock: negative for growth through weaker real incomes and terms of trade, but positive for inflation through higher import and energy costs. Importantly, he stressed that the BOJ remains focused on upside inflation risks and that further hikes remain possible even if growth slows, as long as the economy avoids a severe downturn and price dynamics remain consistent with — or move above — the Bank's forecast path. This means the BOJ is still leaning toward gradual normalization rather than returning to caution, with July remaining the base case for the next rate hike.

GLOBAL MONETARY POLICY RATES

ACTUAL & FORECASTED CENTRAL BANK POLICY RATES OF SELECTED REIGIONS



Source: TBC Capital *(Forecasts are made by weighting the average rate path directions based on our models)*

Macro Overview

GROWTH AND ECONOMIC ACTIVITY



Source: Bloomberg, TBC Capital

US: U.S. GDP rose +2.0% Q/Q, on an annualized rate, in Q1 2026, less than the +2.2% consensus, but a marked increase from the 0.5% growth in Q4. The undershooting was due in large part to the supply shock that has come in the wake of the war in the Middle East.

UK: The economy started the year on a firmer footing, with GDP rising 0.6% Q/Q in Q1, the strongest quarterly pace in a year, and annual growth accelerating to 1.1%, ahead of expectations. The expansion was mainly services-led, supported by stronger wholesale and retail activity, while manufacturing also helped production edge higher.

Eurozone: The Eurozone economy unexpectedly slowed at the start of 2026, with soaring energy costs triggered by the Iran war threatening stagflation in the months ahead. Q1 GDP rose 0.1% from the previous three months – below the 0.2% median estimate. Spain led the way, expanding by 0.6%. Germany grew by 0.3%, while France unexpectedly stagnated.

China: China's economic growth rebounded more than expected in the first quarter, suggesting limited spillovers so far from the war in Iran but revealing weak consumer spending. Powered by strong manufacturing and exports, gross domestic product expanded 5% from a year ago, the fastest in three quarters.

Japan: Economy gained momentum in Q1, with GDP rising 0.5% Q/Q and 2.1% Y/Y, both above expectations and the strongest quarterly expansion since Q3 2024. Growth was supported by firmer private consumption, steady wage gains, and a positive net trade contribution.

INFLATION AND PRICES

HEADLINE CPI INFLATION, Y/Y, %, SELECTED REGIONS



Source: Bloomberg, TBC Capital

US: April inflation reinforced the Fed's caution: CPI re-accelerated to 3.8% Y/Y, with core CPI also firmer at 2.8% Y/Y, showing that the Iran-related energy shock is not the only source of pressure. The larger warning came from PPI, which jumped 6.0% Y/Y, pointing to renewed upstream cost pressures that could later pass through to consumers.

UK: Inflation eased more than expected in April, falling to 2.8% Y/Y from 3.3%, helped by lower housing and household services inflation after the new energy price cap and softer transport costs. The softer print gives the BoE some comfort, but monthly inflation still rose 0.7%, meaning policy caution remains justified while energy-related risks.

Eurozone: Inflation re-accelerated in April, rising to 3.0% Y/Y from 2.6%, while monthly prices increased 1.0%, confirming renewed price pressure as energy and supply risks from the Iran conflict intensified. Core inflation stayed lower at 2.2% Y/Y, but the headline rebound supports the ECB's more cautious and increasingly hawkish stance.

China: Inflation picture turned more energy-driven in April, with CPI rising to 1.2% Y/Y as costs were pushed higher by war-related energy and supply disruptions. The sharper signal came from producer prices, with PPI jumping to 2.8% Y/Y, the fastest rise since 2022, suggesting that China is moving away from the nasty deflationary slump.

Japan: Inflation eased further in April, with headline CPI slipping to 1.4% Y/Y and core CPI falling to 1.4%, below expectations. Softer food inflation also helped, suggesting that domestic price pressures are cooling.

WAGES AND UNEMPLOYMENT

UNEMPLOYMENT RATE, %, SELECTED REGIONS



US: The April jobs report showed a labor market that is cooling but not breaking: payrolls rose by 115K, above expectations but slower than March, while unemployment held steady at 4.3%. With wage growth softer than expected at 3.6% Y/Y, the labor market is not adding much inflation pressure, but if inflation accelerates faster than wages in the coming months, real incomes could weaken and put more pressure on consumer.

UK: The labor market showed further signs of softening, with unemployment rising to 5.0% in the three months to March, slightly above expectations and 0.5pp higher than a year earlier. This weakening supports the case for BoE caution and reduces domestic demand pressure, although it also highlights a more fragile growth backdrop.

Eurozone: The unemployment rate stood at 6.2% in April, unchanged from the rate in March. The labor market of the bloc remains resilient and steady, giving the ECB some leeway in battling the inflationary pressures from the Iran conflict.

China: Labor market improved modestly in April, with the unemployment rate falling to 5.2% from 5.4% in March. The decline suggests some stabilization in employment conditions, but the 5.3% average unemployment rate for 2026 still points to a cautious labor backdrop, especially as higher input costs and external uncertainty weighs on hiring.

Japan: Japan's seasonally adjusted unemployment rate for April 2026 registered at 2.80%, reflecting a slight tightening of the labor market and which is a 0.30% decrease from March 2026's rate of 3.10%.

Source: Bloomberg, TBC Capital

MANUFACTURING ACTIVITY

OFFICIAL MANUFACTURING PMI, SELECTED REGIONS



US: US manufacturing remained in modest expansion in April, with the ISM Manufacturing PMI unchanged at 52.7, marking the fourth consecutive month above the expansion threshold, though slightly below expectations. Stronger new orders, prices and supplier deliveries point to still-resilient demand and renewed cost/supply pressures, while weaker employment suggests caution on hiring.

UK: The S&P Global UK Manufacturing PMI climbed to 53.7 in April 2026 from 51 in the prior month, slightly above the preliminary estimate of 53.6. Survey respondents widely noted that the Middle East conflict and subsequent global supply chain disruptions had weighed heavily on business and consumer confidence.

Eurozone: The S&P Global Eurozone Manufacturing PMI climbed to 52.2 in April 2026, its highest in nearly four years, up from 51.6 in March and matching initial estimates, likely because of the renewed talks about the increasing fiscal spending across the bloc.

China: Official NBS Manufacturing PMI slightly decreased to 50.3 in April 2026 from March's 50.4, exceeding expectations of 50.1. This indicates the second month of growth, aided by increased government spending.

Japan: The S&P Global Japan Manufacturing PMI increased to 55.1 in April 2026, surpassing the flash estimate of 54.9 and rising from 51.6 in March. This was the highest level since January 2022, with significant growth in output and new orders, influenced by the war prompting customers to stock up to avoid supply issues and costs.

Source: Bloomberg, TBC Capital

SERVICES ACTIVITY

OFFICIAL SERVICES PMI, SELECTED REGIONS



US: Services activity remained comfortably expansionary in April, even though the ISM Services PMI eased to 53.6, slightly below expectations and down from 54.0 in March. The details still point to resilient domestic demand, with 14 industries reporting growth and the index running above its 12-month average, suggesting that the services side of the economy continues to cushion broader growth.

UK: S&P Global UK Service PMI came at 52.7 in April, up from March's 11-month low of 50.5, signaling a modest recovery in service sector output growth after the considerable loss of momentum seen in March. However, this improvement could easily prove short-lived as new business intakes remained subdued in comparison to the start of 2026.

Eurozone: Services activity deteriorated sharply in April, with the Services PMI falling from 50.2 to 47.6, moving into contraction for the first time in almost a year and marking the fastest output decline since February 2021. This suggests the Middle East conflict has started to derail the Eurozone recovery through weaker confidence, tighter financial conditions and higher energy uncertainty.

China: NBS Non-Manufacturing PMI dropped to 49.4 in April from 50.1 in March, falling short of the expected 49.9, indicating a contraction in the services sector.

Japan: In April, the S&P Global Japan Services PMI fell to 51.0 - down from 53.4 in March. While this marked the 13th consecutive month of expansion, it was an 11-month low.

Source: Bloomberg, TBC Capital

RETAIL ACTIVITY

RETAIL SALES, Y/Y, %, SELECTED REGIONS



Source: Bloomberg, TBC Capital

US: Consumer spending remained resilient in April, with retail sales rising 0.5% M/M and 4.9% Y/Y, though the pace cooled after March's unusually strong gain. Core measures were also solid, suggesting underlying demand is still holding up, but the moderation points to a consumer that may become more sensitive if higher energy prices persist.

UK: Consumer spending weakened in April, with retail sales falling 1.3% M/M and flat on a year earlier, pointing to renewed pressure on household demand after a stronger start to the year. The decline suggests consumers remain cautious as higher borrowing costs, labor-market softening and energy-related uncertainty continue to weigh on purchasing power.

Eurozone: Consumer spending remained soft in March, with retail trade volumes slipping 0.1% M/M in the euro area. Annual growth was still positive at 1.2% Y/Y, suggesting consumption has not collapsed, but household demand remains fragile as higher inflation, geopolitical uncertainty and tighter financial conditions weigh on purchasing power.

China: Consumer spending weakened sharply in April, with retail sales growth slowing to just 0.2% Y/Y from 1.7% in March and missing expectations by a wide margin. The print suggests the Iran conflict's energy and supply-chain shock is starting to hit household confidence.

Japan: Consumer spending showed renewed strength in April, with retail sales rebounding 1.7% Y/Y, well above expectations and a clear improvement from the previous decline.

PUBLIC SENTIMENT

CONSUMER CONFIDENCE INDICES, SELECTED REGIONS



Source: Bloomberg, TBC Capital

US: Consumer sentiment improved modestly in April, with the Conference Board index rising to 92.8, helped by better labor-market and income expectations during the temporary Middle East ceasefire and equity-market rebound. However, the details were still cautious: views on current and expected business conditions softened, suggesting that consumers remain sensitive to geopolitical uncertainty and inflation pressure.

UK: Public sentiment in April was characterized by deep pessimism and financial anxiety, driven primarily by cost-of-living pressures, the state of the NHS, and geopolitical concerns. The GfK Consumer Confidence Barometer fell four points to (-25), the lowest level seen since autumn 2023.

Eurozone: Public sentiment plummeted in April 2026 as mounting geopolitical tensions and surging energy costs fueled stagflationary fears. The European Commission's Economic Sentiment Indicator (ESI) dropped sharply to 93.0, marking the third consecutive monthly decline.

Japan: Japan's consumer sentiment deteriorated significantly in March 2026, with the confidence index dropping to 33.3 from 39.7 in February, marking the **lowest level since May 2025**. This sharp decline, driven by geopolitical tensions in the Middle East raising energy costs.

Commodities Overview

CRUDE OIL

PAST AND FUTURE FORECASTED SPOT PRICES



Source: TBC Capital

We upgrade our oil outlook as the war has turned the market from a surplus story into a physical shortage story. The main pressure point is the disruption to Persian Gulf exports and production, which is forcing unusually large inventory draws and keeping the market vulnerable to further price spikes. Even though prices have eased from the initial panic levels as markets began pricing some probability of Hormuz reopening, flows remain impaired enough to justify a higher price path. We now see Brent/WTI at $90/$83 in Q4 2026, with the 2027 outlook also higher.

The war affects oil through four channels: lower Gulf supply, higher security premium, refined-product shortages, and demand destruction. The first two are price-positive, while the last one is the market's adjustment mechanism. Refined products matter especially because gasoline, diesel, jet fuel and naphtha prices have risen more sharply than crude, creating direct pressure on consumers, airlines, petrochemicals and trade. That means the economic damage may be larger than the crude price alone suggests.

Our base case assumes Gulf exports normalize by end-June and production gradually recovers, helped by higher output from Saudi Arabia and the UAE in the second half of the year. But the risk balance remains clearly upward. If Hormuz normalization slips to late July, Brent could move above $100; in a severe case with lasting Gulf capacity damage, prices could approach $120. The main catalysts are Hormuz reopening, Gulf production recovery, Saudi/UAE supply response, strategic reserve releases, possible US export restrictions, refined-product shortages and visible signs of demand destruction.

NATURAL GAS

PAST AND FUTURE FORECASTED SPOT PRICES



We keep our natural gas outlook broadly unchanged because weak Asian LNG demand is offsetting part of the Hormuz-related supply shock. The market is still tight, but the shock has not translated into the same kind of one-way bullish story as oil. Asia, especially China, is absorbing most of the adjustment through lower LNG imports, destocking and weaker industrial demand. Japan and South Korea are also softer than expected, partly because naphtha shortages are reducing petrochemical operating rates and therefore gas demand.

This weaker Asian demand gives Europe more time to rebuild storage despite delayed Persian Gulf LNG normalization. In our base case, Persian Gulf LNG flows start normalizing from mid-May and fully normalize by late June. That delay tightens May-June balances, but weaker Asian demand and higher output from other exporters should keep Europe broadly supplied. As long as European gas prices stay high enough to encourage gas-to-coal switching, storage should continue rebuilding into winter.

We forecast TTF at €50/MWh for balance-Q2, €44/MWh in Q3, €40/MWh in Q4, and €44/MWh for balance-2026. For JKM, we see around $18.15/mmBtu for balance-Q2, $15.90/mmBtu in Q3, $14.65/mmBtu in Q4, and roughly $16/mmBtu for balance-2026. Risks are still skewed upward: if Hormuz normalization is delayed to late July, TTF could move toward €65/MWh; in a severe case with slower export recovery and greater Qatari capacity damage, it could reach €80/MWh. The key catalysts are Hormuz flows, Qatari LNG capacity, Asian demand recovery, European storage, weather, coal-switching economics and industrial demand.

Source: TBC Capital

PRECIOUS METALS

PAST AND FUTURE FORECASTED SPOT PRICES



We remain structurally bullish on gold but tactically cautious. Our end-2026 gold forecast remains $5,400/oz, supported by continued reserve diversification, lower speculative positioning and expected Fed cuts. The war strengthens the medium-term case for gold because it reinforces demand for assets that sit outside the traditional geopolitical and financial system. In this environment, central banks and long-term investors have a stronger reason to diversify reserves, especially if the war raises concerns about fiscal sustainability, sanctions risk and geopolitical fragmentation.

That said, the near-term setup is not purely bullish. Gold can still fall during a broader liquidation event. If Hormuz disruptions persist and trigger another sell-off in bonds or equities, investors may sell gold to raise cash, even though gold's strategic role remains intact. This is why the near-term risks are more balanced or slightly downside-skewed, while the medium-term risks remain upside-skewed. The cleaner bullish setup would be one where geopolitical risk stays elevated, the Fed cuts rates, real yields move lower and financial markets avoid forced liquidation.

Silver should benefit from the same precious-metals tailwinds as gold — lower real yields, Fed easing and safe-haven demand — but it is more cyclical. That makes it more vulnerable if the war becomes a broader industrial-demand shock. In a de-escalation scenario, silver could outperform gold because risk appetite and industrial demand would recover alongside lower real rates. In an escalation scenario, gold should remain the cleaner hedge. Main catalysts are Fed cuts, real yields, central-bank gold buying, ETF/speculative flows, equity-market stress and whether the war accelerates long-term reserve diversification.

Source: TBC Capital

INDUSTRIAL METALS

PAST AND FUTURE FORECASTED SPOT PRICES



Source: TBC Capital

We keep our copper price forecast unchanged at $12,650/t for 2026, but the war has introduced a new supply-chain risk. Copper initially traded more on global growth concerns than on direct war exposure: prices sold off as investors worried about demand, then recovered as ceasefire hopes improved risk appetite. The direct war impact comes through sulfur and sulfuric acid, which are key inputs for SX-EW copper production. Because Hormuz is a major route for seaborne sulfur trade, disruptions have tightened sulfur and sulfuric acid markets and created risks for copper producers that rely on imported acid.

The bigger copper debate is therefore between supply disruption and weaker demand. A prolonged Hormuz shock could reduce copper supply through sulfuric acid shortages, but it could also hurt global GDP and industrial demand, partly offsetting the price upside. That is why we do not change the forecast yet, but we would treat copper as increasingly vulnerable to sharp moves in both directions depending on whether the market focuses on supply losses or macro weakness.

For aluminum, the war's impact is more indirect. The key channel is energy: aluminum smelting is power-intensive, so higher gas and electricity prices can raise costs, especially in Europe and other energy-importing regions. At the same time, weaker construction, manufacturing and transport demand can cap upside. So aluminum is not as directly exposed to Hormuz as oil or LNG, and not as specifically exposed as copper through sulfuric acid, but it remains sensitive to the broader energy shock and industrial cycle. Key catalysts are sulfuric acid availability, China export policy, Hormuz flows and energy prices.

Currencies Overview

EUR/USD

PAST AND FUTURE FORECASTED EXCHANGE RATES



Source: TBC Capital

Our stance on EUR/USD has turned clearly bearish, which is a major shift from our previous more constructive medium-term view that had looked for the pair to move toward the 1.20 area.

The change reflects a broader turn in the macro backdrop: the dollar is no longer supported only by risk-off demand from the Iran conflict, but increasingly by firmer US inflation, a more balanced and potentially more hawkish Fed reaction function, stabilizing US labor data, renewed US equity outperformance and improved US terms of trade from stronger energy exports.

At the same time, the euro has become more vulnerable: Europe is more exposed to the energy shock, its terms of trade have deteriorated versus the US, growth momentum has weakened, relative equity returns have collapsed, and the real-yield support that helped the euro after the German fiscal shift has faded.

We still see room for a short-term EUR/USD rebound if the US-Iran situation de-escalates, which is why our near-term target remains 1.17 for Q2, but we expect that strength to prove temporary and see the pair moving lower toward 1.15 in Q3, 1.14 in Q4 and 1.13 by Q1 2027.

GBP/USD

PAST AND FUTURE FORECASTED EXCHANGE RATES



Source: TBC Capital

Our stance on GBP is more neutral in formal positioning, but with a mild bearish bias in the near term.

Previously, we were more constructive on sterling within the European energy-importer bloc because UK growth data and carry looked relatively supportive, especially compared with weaker low-yielding European currencies.

That has changed because politics has moved to the center of the sterling story: regional election losses, rising leadership-risk headlines, fiscal uncertainty and the risk of higher term premia are all likely to weigh on GBP through weaker confidence and a larger political risk discount. Still, we do not expect an aggressive sterling selloff, because UK macro data have not yet materially deteriorated, carry remains a support, and investor positioning is already meaningfully short, limiting the room for sustained additional selling without clearer negative fiscal news.

We therefore see GBP weakness as real but contained, with EUR/GBP potentially moving toward 0.88–0.89, while GBP/USD is lowered mainly because of the broader dollar upgrade, with cable expected around 1.34 in Q2, 1.31 in Q3 and 1.28 in Q4.

USD/JPY

PAST AND FUTURE FORECASTED EXCHANGE RATES



Source: TBC Capital

Our stance remains bullish on USD/JPY and bearish on the yen over the medium term, despite recent Japanese FX intervention.

This is not a change in view: we had already assumed that the Ministry of Finance would intervene before USD/JPY reached a new cycle high, so the latest yen-buying operations do not alter the broader forecast.

The intervention, estimated at roughly JPY 8–9tn, was enough to trigger a sharp temporary drop in USD/JPY, but the overall yen appreciation was modest, reinforcing our view that intervention can slow or smooth depreciation but cannot reverse the trend unless the US dollar and Fed outlook also turn lower. The fundamental backdrop remains yen-negative: global policy differentials are still unfavorable, higher oil prices worsen Japan's terms of trade, fiscal risks are rising through possible supplementary spending and tax-cut discussions, and higher long-end JGB yields could become a negative if they reflect fiscal stress rather than healthy normalization.

We expect intervention risk to keep USD/JPY somewhat capped near term, especially around the 160 area, but not enough to stop the broader upward drift, with forecasts at 158 in Q2, 160 in Q3 and 164 in Q4.

USD/CNY

PAST AND FUTURE FORECASTED EXCHANGE RATES



Our stance on CNY remains constructive, making it the key exception to the broader dollar-positive view.

We continue to expect managed yuan appreciation, and our conviction has improved because the PBoC appears less resistant to CNY strength: the fixing bias has become more two-sided, the fix has moved below 6.85, and market resistance levels have gradually shifted lower, suggesting there is no firm official line preventing additional yuan gains.

The Trump-Xi summit also helped reduce near-term bilateral risk, with discussions around Middle East de-escalation, trade negotiations, possible Chinese purchases of US goods, selective tariff relief and investment fast-tracking all helping sentiment. Seasonal dividend-related outflows remain a risk, but these pressures are not expected to become meaningful until mid-June, leaving near-term space for CNY appreciation.

Because outright USD shorts against CNY remain costly from a carry perspective, our preferred expression is through downside USD/CNH options rather than spot shorts, and we keep forecasts at 6.80 in Q2, 6.75 in Q3 and 6.70 in Q4.

Source: TBC Capital

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